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Abstract
Several experimental studies show that ex post communication promotes generosity in situa-
tions where individual incentives contradict with common interest, like the provision of public
goods. The root underlying the eﬀect of this institution, especially in a repeated interaction,
is nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two mechanisms
by which ex post communication may aﬀect behavior in repeated interactions: one is related
to strategic signaling, the other involves emotions induces by others' opinions.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, the presence of ex post communication (conducted
through the attribution of costless disapproval points) fosters pro-social behavior and reduces
free-riding. Second, I ﬁnd systematic evidence that subjects tend to use ex post communication
as a signaling device, whilst no evidence in favor of the emotion-based hypothesis.
A possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that ex post messages are used to announce
future sanctions for free-riding.
Keywords: Public goods game, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Ex post communication.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D83.
Abstract
Les études expérimentales montrent que la communication a posteriori promeut la générosité
dans les dilemmes sociaux où les incitations individuelles sont en contradiction avec l'intérêt
commun, comme la contribution aux biens publics. Néanmoins, la nature de cette institution,
notamment dans une interaction répétée, reste largement inexpliquée. Mon étude propose un
test empirique de deux mécanismes par lesquels la communication a posteriori peut inﬂuencer
sur le comportement dans les interactions répétées: l'un est lié à la signalisation stratégique,
l'autre implique des émotions induit par l'opinion des autres.
La présence de la communication a posteriori (menée par l'attribution de points de désap-
probation gratuits) renforce le comportement pro-social et réduit le free-riding. Je trouve des
preuves systématiques que la communication a posteriori constitue un moyen de signalisation,
et aucune preuve en faveur de l'hypothèse basée sur l'émotion. Une interprétation possible de
ce phénomène est que les messages sont utilisés pour annoncer des sanctions pour les passages
clandestins.
Mots-clefs: Biens publics, Communication a posteriori.
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1 Introduction
A growing body of experimental studies ﬁnd that institutions promote pro-social norms of behavior
in economic contexts where individual rationality conﬂicts with social interest. These institutions
are predominantly based on two mechanisms: pre-play communication and monetary punishment.1
This paper is devoted to an institution that has been only recently brought to economists' attention
as a means of inducing eﬃciency in social dilemmas: ex post communication. Existing empirical
results are so far sparse, but encouraging. The root underlying the eﬀect of this institution,
especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless still obscure. Hence, the contribution of this
study is twofold. First, it provides a novel empirical testbed for two mechanisms by which ex
post communication may potentially aﬀect behavior in a repeated interaction: one is related to
signaling, the other points to the impact of emotions induces by others' opinion on individual
decisions. Second, it reports new evidence on the role of this institution in overcoming selﬁshness
in social dilemmas.
In a seminal contribution, Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) use a repeated four-
person public goods game, based on the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM in short). After
each round, every subject observes his group members' contributions, sends a message containing
disapproval points to each group member, and is informed about the sum of points received from
others. Masclet et al. conjecture that ex post communication in a repeated interaction may aﬀect
subjects' behavior in two ways. First, it may serve as an information transmission device prior to
the next round  for instance, signal may convey a warning that the sender will decrease his future
contribution unless the receiver increases his. Second, being aware of others' opinions may aﬀect
emotions  for instance, people may display an aversion to being disapproved/a preference for
being approved, and try to act so as to avoid/deserve it.2 They argue that these two eﬀects may
be separated by confronting subjects' behavior under partner and stranger matching. Intuitively,
in the latter the eﬀect of ex post communication may stem from both strategic information trans-
mission and disapproval-aversion, while in the former behavioral eﬀects may only be a matter of
subjects' aversion to disapproval. In their experiment, partner matching yields signiﬁcantly higher
contributions than stranger matching, which supports the information transmission hypothesis. In
a related study, Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) use a similar experimental game and introduce
treatments in which every subject may transmit an emoticon (frownies in one conditions, smilies in
the other) to each parter, and then is informed about the number of emoticons he received. Con-
fronting patterns of behavior under partner (where a moderate treatment eﬀect is observed) and
1See Masclet, Noussair, and Villeval (forthcoming) for a review of this literature.
2Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) refer to ex post communication as non-monetary sanctioning,
provided that in a companion treatment attributed points are transformed into monetary punishment. Similar
nomenclature (like informal sanctions or non-monetary punishment) is also used in other papers discussed in
this section. Since my goal is to test whether this institution is actually used to inform or to sanction people, I
consistently use a more neutral term  ex post communication.
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stranger matching (where there is virtually no eﬀect), the paper concludes that ex post messages
is unlikely to involve emotions, but rather facilitates the exchange of information before upcoming
round.3
However, methodology based on a direct comparison of outcomes arising under partner and
stranger matching may be misleading. An extensive survey by Andreoni and Croson (2008) not
only reveals that both matching schemes (partner and stranger) are very likely to aﬀect per se
subjects' behavior in repeated public goods games, but also that the relationship between both
protocols is ambiguous  in some experiments partner matching provides higher contributions,
other studies report the opposite. Consequently, comparing outcomes observed under stranger and
partner matching dissembles the issue of disentangling proper treatment eﬀects from simultaneous
variation in behavior due to matching method.4
Herein, I propose a novel test of hypotheses put forward by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and
Villeval (2003). The design of my experiment builds on Masclet et al.'s sound intuition that under
both partner and stranger matching ex post communication may aﬀect subjects' emotions, but
only the former also allows for strategic signaling. At the same time, the experiment neutralizes
unwanted eﬀects of matching protocol on contributions. The main ﬁndings are as follows. First,
the presence of ex post communication fosters pro-social behavior and reduces free-riding. Second,
I ﬁnd systematic evidence that subjects tend to use ex post communication as a signaling device,
while no evidence in favor of the emotion-based hypothesis.
3Some studies, on the other hand, suggest that the eﬀect of ex post communication in social dilemmas is driven by
emotions. For instance, López-Pérez and Vorsatz (2010) report that the availability of ﬁxed-form, post-play messages
makes subjects more cooperative in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game. Study by Czap, Czap, Khachaturyan,
Burbach, and Lynne (2011) implements a two-stage game in which a common-pool resource is used by a group of
subjects, out of which some have private incentives to produce publicly undesirable externalities. They ﬁnd that
the reception of a negative emotional feedback (via frownies) after the ﬁrst stage reduces externalities in the second
stage, while providing positive feedback (via smilies) is detrimental with this respect. See also Xiao and Houser
(2009), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and Dugar (2010) for related evidence.
4Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) provide a way to control for matching protocol eﬀects by com-
bining within- and between-subject approach: in every session subjects play a sequence of rounds without com-
munication, which is followed by an analogous sequence with communication, and then another sequence without
communication, holding matching protocol constant. They argue that since subjects' behavior is similar in the
initial sequence under both matching schemes, thus the diﬀerences observed in the second stage are unlikely to
stem from matching protocol eﬀects. Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) use a classical between-subject design
and observe an important scope of matching protocol eﬀects: in each round of every treatment, partner matching
induces higher contributions than stranger matching (see the working paper version of their study, Peeters and
Vorsatz (2009)). In any case, it seems that the safest way to deal with these unpredictable eﬀects is to prevent
them from happening in the ﬁrst place.
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2 Empirical strategy
The experimental methodology introduced by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and
subsequently used by Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) has one important virtue and one im-
portant inconvenience when it comes to disentangling the signaling dimension and the emotional
dimension of ex post communication in a repeated interaction. Its advantage is that it identiﬁes
environments where both of these phenomena either can or cannot coexist. The main disadvantage
is that these environments may per se aﬀect behavior simultaneously to the content of messages,
and this eﬀect is furthermore unpredictable and virtually unmeasurable. Thus, the main challenge
underlying my empirical strategy is to maintain the former feature, while dealing with the latter.
To this end, I introduce an innovative uniform matching protocol. In each round of a repeated
game, subjects decide upon their level on contribution before learning whether their group prevails
until next round. Consequently, I neutralize the forward-looking strategic eﬀects of matching
protocol on contributions, while controlling for the backward-looking factors (as discussed in the
next section). Ex post communication, in turn, only takes place after the fate of groups is known
to subjects. Consequently, the eﬀect of communication can be captured in two diﬀerent strategic
contexts: when groups prevail from one period to another, and when they change between rounds.
In line with the Masclet et al. original argument, strategic information transmission is solely
possible in the latter case, while referring to emotions may occur in both cases.
Like Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming),
I implement non-verbal communication. In order to assure the interpretability of messages, my
experimental setting includes the following characteristics. First, the VCM game is played by
groups of two subjects, so in each round every participant learns about other group member's
contribution, sends a message and receives one in return. Consequently, messages may be easily
matched to actions, which creates an environment that (i) facilitates agents' comprehension of
non-verbal content, and (ii) allows the experimenter to establish a relationship between individual
messages and individual contributions.5 Second, it is of common knowledge that no group ever re-
appears after having been re-matched, which rules out strategic information transmission between
subjects who are about to cease interacting.6
5It should me mentioned that studies by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and Peeters and Vorsatz
(forthcoming) (that use a four-person VCM game) explore the formation and the role of monetary and non-monetary
mechanisms of peer pressure, which diﬀers substantially from my objective. In these experiments, players evaluate
remaining group members' actions, and receive a bundled message containing the sum of three evaluations attributed
to him by others (via either points or emoticons), which makes the link between a single message and a single action
is much more ambiguous.
6In contrast, the stranger matching procedures adopted by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and
Peeters and Vorsatz (forthcoming) are not "leakproof": the same subjects may interact multiple times throughout
the experiment, even though they can never ascertain each other's identity. Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval
(2003) inform subjects that the probability of being matched with anyone for two consecutive rounds is null, and that
the same applies to being part of the same group of four players more than once throughout the experiment. Peeters
5
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2.1 Experimental game and conditions
Experimental game. Pairs of subjects play the following version of VCM game. Each player
holds an initial endowment of 15 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), and may contribute any
part of it to the common pool.7 Decisions are made simultaneously and the amount accumulated
in the common pool is then multiplied by 1.5 and re-transferred to group members in equal parts.
Thus, the gain of player i who contributes Ni and interacts with player j who contributes Mj
equals:
Gaini = 15− 0.25×Ni + 0.75×Mj (1)
Although social welfare is maximized when each player contributes his entire endowment, the
dominant strategy is to contribute nothing.8
Baseline condition. In the baseline condition (BC for short), the game is repeated in the
following way. In each occurrence, subjects (i) decide upon their contribution to the common
pool, (ii) learn whether their current group prevails until next round, and ﬁnally (iii) observe other
group member's contribution, as well as personal gain. Subjects are informed that groups survive
with a 50% chance, and that every change is permanent  groups that disappear cannot re-appear
in the future. In all rounds following round 1, an announcement prior to stage (i) reminds subjects
whether their group has changed with respect to the previous period. The important issue of the
asymmetry of information about players' past behavior between maintained and newly formed
groups is addressed in the following way. Before stage (i), members of newly matched pairs are
informed about the decision that was taken recently by their current group member in his former
group.
Evaluation condition. Evaluation condition (EC in short) encompasses the three stages forming
BC, as well as the current-group-status reminder. In addition, in stage (iv) subjects are asked
to express their opinion about group member's decision by attributing him a certain number of
points (between 0 and 10). Experimental instructions state that a high number of points expresses
disapproval: 10 points correspond to the strongest disapproval, while 0 points correspond to the
weakest disapproval, and that attributed points do not aﬀect either participant's gains for the
experiment.9 Then, each subject is informed about the number of points he received from the
other group member. If groups change between periods t− 1 and t, prior to stage (i) subjects not
only learn about the decision taken by their current group member in t− 1 (like in BC), but also
and Vorsatz (forthcoming) allow for a completely random matching. Clearly, this makes strategic information
transmission between subjects across rounds much more diﬃcult, but not impossible.
7In the lab implementation, contributions may only take integer values between 0 ECU and 15 ECU.
8To avoid framing eﬀects, instructions use neutral phrasing: I use expressions such as players and group members
rather than partner, and contributions are never related to cooperation. See Rege and Telle (2004) for evidence on
the eﬀect of problem framing in public goods experiments.
9This closely resembles the procedure adopted by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003).
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about the number of points he received.
2.2 Experimental procedures.
The experiment involves a total o 12 sessions (6 for each experimental condition), each comprising
8 subjects. I use round-robin matching protocol (that assures that each two subjects have an
opportunity to interact during the experiment) and a random group survival rule outlined above.
Consequently, the structure of group matching and the number of rounds diﬀer between sessions.
In order to control for the eﬀects of these variations, I use six independent, randomly generated
matching sequences (henceforth labeled Game 1, . . ., Game 6 ) and run two separate sessions for
each of them: one implementing BC and one implementing EC. Subjects are informed that the
game contains between 10 and 16 rounds and that its length is determined randomly. In practice,
sessions contain between 11 and 15 rounds, and pairs of subjects interact for up to ﬁve consecutive
rounds.
At the beginning of each session, participants are randomly assigned to their computers and
asked to ﬁll in a small personal questionnaire containing basic questions about their age, gender,
education, etc. The written instructions are then read aloud. Before starting, subjects are also
asked to ﬁll in a quiz assessing their understanding of the game they are about to play. Once the
quiz and all remaining questions are answered, the experiment begins.
Once all pairs complete a round of the game, subjects are either informed that a new round
starts, or that the experiment ends. In the latter case, a single round is randomly drawn and each
participant receives the amount in EUR corresponding to his gains in that round (converted from
ECU to EUR using an exchange rate 1 ECU = 0.40 EUR), plus a show-up fee equal to 5 EUR.
All sessions took place in the lab of University Paris 1 (LEEP) in July 2012. The recruitment
of subjects has been carried out via LEEP database among individuals who have successfully
completed the registration process on Laboratory's website.10 Among 96 participants, 51 are males
and 45 are females. 63 participant are students, among which 67% might have some background
in game theory due to their ﬁeld of study.11 82 subjects took part in experiments organized in
LEEP in the past. Participants' average age is roughly 25. No subject participated in more than
one experimental session. Each session lasted about 45 minutes, with an average payoﬀ of 12.20
Euros.
7
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Table 1: Average contributions according to treatment and experimental game
Conditions Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Average p
Average contributions in round 1
Baseline 7.625 6.750 8.125 6.375 5.750 3.875 6.417 0.210
Evaluation 6.250 8.250 6.500 8.375 7.875 8.750 7.667
Overall average contributions
Baseline 5.000 2.900 4.420 3.083 6.010 2.846 3.942 0.046
Evaluation 4.083 7.783 6.045 6.325 9.135 8.029 6.938
Session details
Number of subjects 8 8 8 8 8 8
Number of rounds 12 15 11 15 12 13
Note. Columns 1-6 present average contributions in each experimental game, using data from round 1 (upper part) and all
rounds (middle part). The last two columns summarize these results and provide non-parametric tests for the signiﬁcance of
the eﬀect of treatment on contributions: the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test using individual observations in round
1, and Wilcoxon signed-rank test using game-level matched averages for the aggregate data. The lower part of the table
contains additional information on the number of subjects and the length of each experimental game.
3 Results
This section establishes four principal results arising from aggregate and individual data analysis.
In aggregate terms, I report that the presence of ex post communication restrains selﬁshness.
Individual data suggest that the cause of this behavioral transition lies in strategic signaling
rather than emotional pressure.
4 Aggregate treatment eﬀects
Table 1 presents subjects' average contributions as a function of the structure of experimental
game and experimental condition. The principal ﬁnding is the following:
Result 1. Average contribution in evaluation condition signiﬁcantly increases as compared to
baseline condition. However, this eﬀect does not occur in the initial round.
Support 1. In ﬁve experimental games out of six, the presence of ex post communication increases
the average contribution. This shift of behavior is signiﬁcant at the 5% level according to the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.12 On the other hand, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test using
individual observations from round 1 does not reject the hypothesis that subjects' behavior is the
10The recruitment uses Orsee Greiner (2004); the experiment is computerized through a software developed
under Regate Zeiliger (2000).
11Disciplines such as economics, engineering, management, political science, psychology, mathematics applied in
social science, mathematics, computer science, sociology, biology.
12For each of the six games, this test matches averge contributions observed in BC and in EC, and therefore
accounts for the eﬀects related to diﬀerent game structures.
8
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Table 2: Aggregate determinants of contributions
α p α p
Determinants: Round 1 Overall
Intercept (α0) 5.429 0.000 0.313 0.944
1[Evaluation_condition] (α1) 1.413 0.186 4.770 0.045
Game_2 (α2) 1.530 0.411 0.843 0.858
Game_3 (α3) 0.723 0.698 1.838 0.706
Game_4 (α4) 0.877 0.636 0.884 0.838
Game_5 (α5) 0.634 0.732 5.288 0.317
Game_6 (α6) -0.252 0.892 1.490 0.730
Note. Tobit regressions of subject's contribution on the set of explanatory variables including dummies indicating treatment
and experimental games. The round 1 regression uses 8 independent observations from each session (96 in total). The overall
regression uses 1248 observations from 12 experimental sessions, standard errors are estimated using observations clustered
at the session level, and then corrected using delete-one jackknife.
same in both experimental environments (p=0.210). 
Support 2. The eﬀect of treatment variable is quantiﬁed using regression models summarized
in Table 2. Controlling for game-structure ﬁxed eﬀects (dummies Game_2, . . . , Game_6), I ﬁnd
that the overall impact of communication (dummy 1[Evaluation_condition] equal to 1 for EC, 0
for BC) on subjects' contributions is highly positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level (H0 : α1 = 0,
p = 0.045).13 On the other hand, regression analysis points to the insigniﬁcance of treatment
variable in round 1 (H0 : α1 = 0, p = 0.186). 
To further highlight the behavioral transition caused by the presence of communication, Figure
4 compares distributions of contributed amounts in both experimental conditions. In BC, over
40% (251 out of 624) of decisions result in a null contribution, as compared to less than 25%
(148/624) in EC. Moreover, contributions between 1 ECU and 4 ECU are more frequent in the
former than in the latter. Then, the relationship between the two conditions is unstable until the
threshold level of 10 ECU, above which all values appear substantially more often in EC than in
BC, including the case in which the entire endowment is tranferred to the common pool (105 times
in EC against 63 times in BT).
13Since subjects' contributions often take extreme values (either 0 or 15), all models explaining changes in this
variable rely on a double-censored tobit regression rather than a simple OLS regression. By the same token, all
models explaining the pattern of the attribution of evaluation points (ranging between 0 and 10) are also double-
censored tobit. Furthermore, in order to account for the within-session correlation between individual observations
after the initial round of the game, standard errors are calculated for data clustered at the session level, and corrected
for the potential small-sample bias using the leave-one-out jackknife procedure; see Bell and McCaﬀrey (2002),
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), Jacquemet and Zylbersztejn (2010) for a related discussion. Observations
from round 1 are considered independent. All reported p-values come from two-sided tests.
9
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.11
Figure 1: Distribution of contributions across treatments
Note. For each experimental treatment, data contain 624 observations
from 6 experimental sessions. Contributions are given in ECU.
5 Individual behavior
This section explores the determinants of individual decisions in both experimental conditions.
In particular, it highlights the patterns by which information coming from two diﬀerent sources
 ex post communication and observation of other players' history  aﬀects individual choices.
Like previous studies by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003) and Peeters and Vorsatz
(forthcoming), I categorize observations according to the relative importance of contribution to
the group. The term excessive contributor describes a subject who contributes more then the
other group member, otherwise subject is referred to as moderate contributor.
5.1 Impact of information on contributions
Results provided in this section relies on a linear model relating the level of contribution in t to cur-
rentRound and a set of events from t−1: Own_contributiont−1 andGroup_member′s_contributiont−1,
(in the evaluation treatment only) the number of points he has sent to (Sent_pointst−1) and
received from the other player (Received_pointst−1). The eﬀects linked to group re-matching
are captured by the following variables: 1[Re −matchingt−1] (dummy equal to if groups are re-
matched between periods t−1 and t, 0 otherwise), its interactions with variables mentioned above,
10
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Table 3: Individual determinants of contributions
Status in t− 1 Excessive contributor Moderate contributor
Experimental condition Baseline Evaluation Baseline Evaluation
Determinants: β p β p β p β p
Intercept (β0) -3.801 0.196 3.818 0.244 -2.082 0.254 -2.814 0.485
Own_contributiont−1 (β1) 0.864 0.107 0.413 0.087 1.260 0.022 1.442 0.002
Group_member′s_contributiont−1 (β2) 0.813 0.072 0.542 0.039 0.109 0.211 0.099 0.727
Received_pointst−1 (β3)   -0.258 0.489   0.447 0.029
Sent_pointst−1 (β4)   -0.437 0.013   0.020 0.920
Round (β5) -0.171 0.490 -0.012 0.925 -0.162 0.325 -0.126 0.551
1[Re−matchingt−1] (β6) 3.038 0.104 -5.495 0.209 4.094 0.235 4.196 0.270
×Own_contributiont−1 (β7) -0.358 0.243 0.365 0.061 -0.625 0.429 -0.807 0.033
×Partner′s_contributiont−1 (β8) -0.926 0.005 -0.505 0.169 -0.183 0.236 -0.218 0.492
×Received_pointst−1 (β9)   0.666 0.248   -0.677 0.001
×Sent_pointst−1 (β10)   0.264 0.061   -0.056 0.902
×New_GM ′s_received_pointst−1 (β11)   0.191 0.591   0.051 0.837
×New_GM ′s_contributiont−1 (β12) 0.288 0.024 0.491 0.008 0.047 0.743 0.260 0.147
×Round (β13) 0.122 0.611 -0.142 0.625 -0.052 0.821 0.211 0.293
Number of obs. 225 235 351 341
Note. Tobit regressions of excessive contributors' (whose Own_contributiont−1 > Group_member′s_contributiont−1)
and moderate contributors' (whose Own_contributiont−1 ≤ Group_member′s_contributiont−1) contributions in period
t on the set of variables indicating current Round and events from t − 1 including: subjects' Own_contributiont−1, his
Group_member′s_contributiont−1, (in EC only) the number of points he has sent to and received from the other player,
the occurrence of group re-matching (dummy 1[Re−matchingt−1] equal to if groups are re-matched between periods t− 1
and t, 0 otherwise), the interactions of 1[Re−matchingt−1] with previous variables, and the information about current group
member's situation in t−1 should re-matching occur: New_GM ′s_received_pointst−1 and New_GM ′s_contributiont−1.
For each experimental condition, I use data from 6 sessions. Standard errors are estimated using observations clustered at
the session level, and then corrected using delete-one jackknife.
and the information about current group member's situation in t − 1 that becomes available if
re-matching occurred between t − 1 and t: New_GM ′s_received_pointst−1 (in EC only) and
New_GM ′s_contributiont−1 (in both BC and EC). Table 3 contains the estimates of this model
for four diﬀerent subsets of observations, categorized according to subjects' status in t−1 (excessive
contributor or moderate contributor) and experimental condition (baseline or evaluation).
Models suggest that in both experimental conditions excessive contributors relate their deci-
sions to their group members' reputation, whereas moderate contributors ignore this information.
Furthermore, ex post messages in EC systematically inﬂuence the future choices of each contribu-
tor type as long as pairs last, and have no eﬀect after re-matching. These phenomena are described
in details by the two results:
Result 2. In both experimental conditions, the contribution in t of a subject who acted as an
excessive contributor in t−1 is increased by his current group member's contribution in t−1. The
information about others' past behavior is ignored by subjects who acted as moderate contributors
11
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in t− 1.
Support. Irrespective of the occurrence of re-matching between t−1 and t, excessive contributors'
choices remain cooperative and become adapted to their current group member's reputation from
t − 1. In the absence of re-matching between t − 1 and t, excessive contributors increase their
contributions in t more the higher was other player's contribution in t− 1 (H0 : β2 = 0, p = 0.072
in BC, p = 0.039 in EC). In the case of re-matching between t − 1 and t, this information
becomes irrelevant (H0 : β2 + β8 = 0, p = 0.738 in BC, p = 0.844 in EC), instead excessive
contributors adapt their contributions in accordance with their new group member's behavior in
t − 1 (H0 : β12 = 0, p = 0.024 in BC, p = 0.008 in EC). Moderate contributors, in turn, ignore
other players' reputation.14 
Result 3. In evaluation condition, moderate contributors increase their contribution in t more
the more points they received in t− 1, and excessive contributors decrease their contributions in
t more the more points they sent in t− 1, but only if their groups prevail between t− 1 and t.
Support. In the absence of re-matching, excessive contributors ignore evaluation received in t−1
(H0 : β3 = 0, p = 0.489), but at the same time their contribution decreases more the more points
they sent to their group members (H0 : β4 = 0, p = 0.039). Moderate contributors, in turn, display
a converse motivation, increasing their contribution in t more the more points they received in
t − 1 (H0 : β3, p = 0.029), while ignoring the points they have sent themselves (H0 : β4 = 0,
p = 0.920). In the presence of re-matching between t − 1 and t, neither sent or received points
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on excessive contributors' behavior (testing H0 : β9 = 0, H0 : β10 = 0
yields p = 0.226 and p = 0.130, respectively). Moderate contributors remain neutral to the latter
(H0 : β3 + β9 = 0, p = 0.897), while their reaction to the former inverts  their contribution in t
decreases in the number of points they received prior to re-matching (H0 : β4+β10 = 0, p = 0.018).
Lastly, the information about the number of points received by the member of current group in
his former group in period t − 1 does not aﬀect players' decisions (H0 : β11 = 0, p = 0.591 for
excessive contributors, p = 0.837 for moderate contributors). 
5.2 Formation of ex post messages
This section analyses the signal formation in evaluation treatment by establishing a link between ex
post messages and both group members' choices. To this end, I estimate linear models represent-
ing the number of points received by a player in round t as a function of his Own_contributiont,
as well as its relative size within his group  i.e. the magnitude of a Positive_deviationt or a
Negative_deviationt (in absolute terms) with respect to other group member's decision. The
temporal dimension is represented by variable Round. In order to highlight the eﬀect of the per-
spective of future interaction, I furthermore divide observations according to groups' fate (survival
14Testing H0 : β2 = 0, H0 : β2+β8 = 0, H0 : β12 = 0 yields p = 0.211, p = 0.597, p = 0.743 in BC, and p = 0.727,
p = 0.441, and p = 0.147 in EC, respectively.
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Table 4: Disapproval points and relative contribution
Status of group Prevails until t+ 1 Disappears after t
Determinants: γ p γ p
Intercept (γ0) 6.270 0.003 5.634 0.045
Own_contributiont (γ1) -0.748 0.003 -0.675 0.005
Positive_deviationt (γ2) 0.131 0.456 -0.135 0.207
Negative_deviationt (γ3) 0.351 0.012 0.326 0.132
Round (γ4) 0.216 0.174 0.167 0.276
Number of obs. 288 288
Note. Tobit regressions of the number of received points received in t on variables indicating the level of Own_contributiont,
the value of a Positive_deviationt or a Negative_deviationt (in absolute terms) as compared to other player's contribution,
and current Round. The left-hand (right-hand) side regressions use observations for which pairs prevail (change) between
periods t and t+ 1. Standard errors are estimated using observations clustered at the session level, and then corrected using
delete-one jackknife.
or disappearance) at the time of point attribution, and run separate regressions for each scenario.
Estimates are summarized in Table 4. The main result is:
Result 4. In the evaluation treatment, moderate contributors receive signiﬁcantly more points
the lower is their relative contribution, but only if their group prevails until the next round.
Support. Regardless of whether groups survive or not after period t, own contribution has a sim-
ilar and negative eﬀect on the received number of points (H0 : γ1 = 0, p = 0.005 if groups change,
p = 0.003 if they prevail). Moreover, in both cases received points are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by the magnitude of positive deviation (H0 : γ2 = 0, p = 0.207 and p = 0.456, respectively). The
crucial diﬀerence arises for a negative deviation: even though estimated values of γ3 are alike in
both regressions, it turns out that this eﬀect is only signiﬁcant if groups will prevail until next
round (H0 : γ3 = 0, p = 0.132 and p = 0.012, respectively). 
5.3 Discussion
The analysis of aggregate data provided in Section 4 shows that the availability of ex post commu-
nication using costless evaluation points promotes pro-social generosity in a public goods game,
a result that is in line with what has been reported by Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval
(2003).
Moreover, my ﬁndings testify against the hypothesis that the eﬀect of ex post communication is
emotion-based. The lack of a signiﬁcant inter-treatment diﬀerence in average contributions in the
initial round of the game suggests that the perspective of receiving feedback from others does not
make participants' behavior more cooperative, as opposed to ﬁndings put forward by López-Pérez
and Vorsatz (2010). Moreover, on the individual level I ﬁnd no systematic relationship between
messages and actions in groups that are bound for disappearance.
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On the other hand, experimental evidence suggests that ex post communication is used to
convey strategic signals. An interesting angle to interpret this ﬁnding come from the dynamic
theory of conditional cooperation proposed by Keser and van Winden (2000), according to which
subjects' readiness to cooperate depends on two factors: their experience (reactive behavior) and
their perception of future interaction (future-oriented behavior). In the context of this experiment,
reactive behavior only seems present among excessive contributors who keep on adapting their
decisions according to current group member's recent choices. Moderate contributors remain
neutral to this information. This situation is persistent in both treatments, and within both
maintained and changing groups. Transmission of disapproval points seems to induce future-
oriented behavior for both types of players. Excessive contributors send meaningful signals (in the
sense that expressed disapproval is related to the magnitude of others' free-riding) only in pairs
that are known to last for at least one more period. Furthermore, these signals have a clear and
consistent eﬀect on subjects' behavior: the stronger the disapproval, the greater the reduction of
future contributions from excessive contributors who send it, and the greater increase of future
contributions from moderate contributors who receive it.
Therefore, the dynamic theory of conditional coordination suggests that the positive eﬀect of
ex post communication in this experiment stems from engaging subjects into a future-oriented
cooperative behavior in pairs that survive from one period to another. One possible interpretation
of this phenomenon is that these signals express penalty administered by decreasing future con-
tribution.15 Excessive contributors may aim at inducing group members to cooperate by making
them realize the future consequences of their current misconduct. However, retaining the cred-
ibility of such warnings within randomly evolving groups also requires an immediate execution
of announced sanctions. At the same time, moderate contributors may instantaneously rise their
contributions in the fear of possible sanctions in the future. Obviously, such use of disapproval
points leaves no sensible role for communication in pairs that are aware that their interaction is
about to terminate for ever, which is clearly reﬂected by experimental data.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a novel study of the role of ex post communication in fostering socially beneﬁ-
cial behavior in a repeated public goods game. I experimentally test the existence of two channels
through which such communication may help improve the outcomes of repeatedly occurring social
dilemmas: one is related to the transmission of strategic signals between players, the other involves
subjects' emotions.
I report two principal ﬁndings. First, the presence of ex post communication (carried out via
costless points expressing disapproval) signiﬁcantly enhances subjects' willingness to contribute
15Such possibility is also mentioned in Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003).
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to the public good. Second, I ﬁnd evidence against the hypothesis that ex post messages aﬀect
subjects' behavior through emotions related to others' approval or disapproval. On the other hand,
experimental data systematically point towards the importance of strategic signaling. A possible
interpretation of this phenomenon is that messages are used to announce sanctions for free-riding.
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